

SOME
THOUGHTS
CONCERNING
HAPPINESS.

By IRENÆUS KRANTZOVIVS.

Translated from the Original German,
with NOTES, by A. B.

Ὡ γένοι ἀλλὰ σέβασθε μετ' ἡπυχίας τὰδε πάντα.
PYTHAGORAS.

Καὶ γὰρ ἐν βαρυθύμῳ
Ὁ γὰρ ὁ σώφρων οὐ διαφθαρήσεται.
EURIPID. in Bacchis.

L O N D O N :

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THEOLOGY

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T H E

Translator's PREFACE.

PERHAPS it may be thought useless to introduce a Treatise of this kind into a Country, where the Arts of Happiness are so much studied, and so well understood; but as it seems a tolerable good Abridgment of what lies scattered up and down in many large Volumes, and as those who care not to employ so much Time and Labour as the Reading them would require, may think it worth while to bestow Half an Hour upon this little Piece; I thought I should do no inconsiderable Service to my Countrymen in Translating it.

I have, throughout the Whole, taken the Liberty to make Alterations where

I found it necessary : And have thrown out some few Observations which I judg'd superfluous ; especially such as seem'd more particularly to relate to the Customs of the Author's own Nation. But to vindicate this Method of Proceeding, I have added short Notes in most of the Places where those Omissions are made.

I have entirely left out, except in one Passage, the numberless Quotations from Writers of all Ages and Countries, which were added to confirm every Part of the System ; as they gave it an Air of Pedantry, which would have done it harm in England, whatever effect it might have in Germany.


I wish I could have freed it from another Objection, which may possibly be made to it by some People ; I mean, the Mathematical Method it is put into : Which indeed seems rather too affected in Subjects of this Nature. But I found it was impossible to bring about this Design, without doing Injustice to the Clearness, Conciseness, and Strength of Reasoning, so remarkable through the whole Treatise.

I am sorry 'tis not in my Power to satisfy the Curiosity of my Readers, by some Account of its Author ; but the Person who communicated it to me in Manuscript, a Person well acquainted with most of the learned Men in Germany, told me he believ'd the Name in the Title-Page to be merely fictitious ; since he never, upon the exactest Inquiry, could get any Information about such an Author : And the reason of his concealing himself will appear to every Man, who considers the Danger of speaking contrary to receiv'd Opinions in some Countries.



SOME

I am sorry it was not in my power to
 justify the Carriage of my Horses; by
 the assistance of the Author; but the
 reason was communicated to me in
 a letter, a Person well acquainted
 with most of the learned Men in
 France, told me he believed the Name in
 the Title Page to be merely fictitious;
 that he never, upon the exactest inquiry,
 could get any Information about such an
 Author: And the reason of his conceal-
 ing himself will appear to every Man
 who considers the Danger of speaking
 contrary to received Opinions in
 France.





SOME
THOUGHTS
CONCERNING
HAPPINESS.

AS there is nothing which has more employ'd Mankind in all Ages, than the search after Happiness; nor any Thing about which there has been a greater Disagreement; I think it will not be Time mispent, to consider a little that important Subject. I will therefore deliver the Result of those Observations which I have made upon human Nature; and that I may avoid the Mistakes which so many great Men have run into before me, I will endeavour, by the Means of *Definitions, Postulata, and Axioms*, to
clear

clear up the Confusion which has hitherto reigned in this Affair.

DEFINITION I.

Happiness is that State of a Being, in which it is entirely contented with what is present.

DEF. II.

(a) Man is an Animal sensible of Pleasure or Pain, arising from the internal Motion of the Parts of his Body, and the external Impressions of other Bodies upon it ; and also capable of reflecting upon past and future Events.

DEF. III.

Motion is the successive Application of the Body to the different Parts of Space ; and, being contrary to the *vis inertiae* of Matter, is always perform'd with Difficulty.

DEF. IV.

Thinking is an Operation of the Mind, by which it endeavours to find out some Truth.

(a) *Man is an Animal, &c.* It is worth while to observe here, that this is far from a compleat Definition of Man ; nor do I imagine the Author intended any Thing farther, than to take in that Part of the Idea only, which would be of Service to him in the following Propositions. *A. B.*

DEF.

DEF. V.

Reputation is the Opinion, utter'd by Words, which Men have of our Actions; and is acquir'd and maintain'd by such Actions, as either suppose a superior Degree of Knowledge, or a Concern for the Welfare of Mankind.

DEF. VI.

Curiosity is that Desire by which we are excited to search the Uses, Relations, Properties, &c. of Things, and consequently is the Foundation of all Knowledge.

DEF. VII.

Benevolence is the Desire of procuring all possible kinds of Good to others, without regarding one's own Interest; and is call'd general or particular, according to the Number of Objects it is exercised towards.

POSTULATUM I.

One Happiness is not greater than another.

POST. II.

Man is a Being capable of arriving at the State mention'd in Definition I. and consequently is design'd for it.

AXIOM I.

Man is a limited Creature.

B

A X.

A X. II.

The Objects of Knowledge are infinite.

A X. III.

The Kinds of Good are infinite.

A X. IV.

Nature, by the Frame of every Animal, points out what it is design'd for.

A X. V.

Man is incapable of directing future Events, or altering past Ones.

A X. VI.

An uncertain Evil is rather to be ventur'd, than a certain one produc'd.

PROPOSITION I.

Happiness is inconsistent with any Desire that cannot be satisfy'd: For as long as we are under the Influence of such a Desire, we must always be discontented with our present State; but that is contrary to the Idea of Happiness given Def. 1. *Ergo* Happiness is &c. Q. E. D.

PROP. II.

Knowledge is inconsistent with Happiness: For by Def. 6. Knowledge is founded upon Desire; and the Objects of Knowledge being infinite by Ax. 2. the Desire must be infinite: but Man being limited by Ax. 1. that Desire cannot be satisfy'd; and therefore by Prop.

[II]

Prop. 1. it is inconsistent with Happiness. *Ergo* Knowledge &c. Q. E. D.

PROP. III.

Thinking is inconsistent with Happiness : For by Def. 4. it supposes an Endeavour to find out some Truth, and this shews a Desire of Knowledge ; but by Prop. 2. Knowledge is inconsistent with Happiness. *Ergo* Thinking is &c. Q. E. D.

SCHOLIUM.

Hence appears the Reason why thoughtless People are always observ'd to be healthy and easy, and those given much to Meditation, on the contrary, to be meagre and peevish : For thus Nature always punishes those who will act in Defiance of her Designs.

PROP. IV.

(b) Benevolence cannot make a Man happy : For by Def. 7. Benevolence is the Desire of procuring all possible

(b) Hence is seen the Justness of Reasoning in a neighbouring Nation, where the word *Good*, in the Sense of Benevolent, generally carries the Idea of a Fool. I must also observe, to the Honour of the *English*, that this Notion has been adopted by them, among many others which tend very much to the Improvement of Life ; as may be seen by those who have the Happiness to frequent the Company of our young travelled Sages. A. B.

Kinds of Good to others; but by Ax. 1. and 3. Man is a limited Creature, and the Kinds of Good are infinite, therefore 'tis a Desire which cannot be satisfy'd; but by Prop. 1. such a Desire is inconsistent with Happiness. *Ergo* Benevolence cannot &c. Q. E. D.

PROP. V.

Reputation cannot make a Man happy: For by Def. 5. compared with Prop. 2. and 4. it is acquir'd and maintain'd by such Actions as destroy Happiness. *Ergo* Reputation &c. Q. E. D.

PROP. VI.

Happiness cannot arise from Views of Futurity: For since Man cannot by Ax. 5. direct future Events, if they give Happiness it must be by knowing what will certainly happen; but by Ax. 1. and 2. Man is incapable of such a Knowledge, and that which he is capable of is inconsistent with Happiness by Prop. 2. *Ergo* Happiness cannot &c. Q. E. D.

COROLLARY.

It follows from the last Prop. that a Man ought not to lay down any other Plan to guide himself by, but that of enjoying such Pleasures as shall offer themselves from Time to Time.

PROP.

PROP. VII.

Happiness cannot arise from reflecting upon past Events; for by Ax. 5. Man is incapable of altering what is past; and when he reflects on such Events as displease him, he must wish it were in his Power to alter them; but such a Wish *i. e.* Desire, is inconsistent with Happiness by Prop. 1. *Ergo* Happiness &c. Q. E. D.

COROLL.

It follows from the last Prop. that a Man ought never to examine his past Conduct

PROP. VIII.

The pleasing Sensations may give Happiness: for they so entirely employ the Soul when enjoy'd in a certain Degree, as to destroy Thinking; and therefore by Prop. 3. take away that which alone in this Case can be inconsistent with the State described in Def. 1. *Ergo* the pleasing Sensations &c. Q. E. D.

COROLL. I.

It follows from the last Prop. that the Pleasures of the Body are preferable to those of the Mind, according to the Opinion of ARISTIPPUS.

COROLL. II.

It follows also that the Pleasures of the Body are not necessary to the Happiness of him

him who is not a Slave to Thinking, unless just when Uneasiness attends an Appetite's not being indulg'd; and therefore the older a Man is, unless when he becomes childish, the more allowable it is for him to seek Occasions of the titillating Enjoyments: for however regular and philosophical we may be, yet the numberless Ideas receiv'd in a long Course of Years will without this Expedient grow troublesome, and form themselves sometimes into Doubts, Questions, Negations, Assertions, Conclusions, &c. all which constitute Thinking.

P R O P. IX.

A wise Man will not fall in Love: for Love being Benevolence confin'd to a single Object is by Def. 7. the Desire of procuring all the possible Kinds of Good to that Object; but such a Desire is prov'd inconsistent with Happiness by Prop. 4. *Ergo* a wise Man &c. Q. E. D.

S C H O L I U M.

I desire the Favour of the pretty Fellows who may be shock'd perhaps at first Sight with this Prop. to observe, that I do not mean to confound Love with another Passion something resembling it.

P R O P.

PROP. X.

A wise Man may marry: for a Wife contributes towards Happiness, by destroying that which is inconsistent with it by Prop. 9. and also by giving that which sometimes produces it by Prop. 8. *Ergo* a wise Man &c. Q. E. D.

SCHOLIUM.

I recommend this Prop. to the Consideration of all young Gentlemen, who seem not to have a due regard for those noble Sources of Pleasure, the Nose, the Palate, the Teeth, and another Part equally valuable.

PROP. XI.

(c) A wise Man ought to use the least Motion possible; for Motion by Def. 3. is perform'd with Difficulty, which includes Pain; but Pain being contrary to the pleasing Sensations, must produce a con-

(c) Here the Author takes an Opportunity of disclaiming against Court-Ceremonies; but as our Court is famous for an easiness of Behaviour, I thought his Reflections quite unnecessary in the Translation. This Prop. shews the Unreasonableness of Cringing, unless upon the most weighty Occasions; and therefore a wise Man should reserve the Bow of Veneration, or that which carries the Head lower than the Knee, for the First Minister only and his Porter: Which ought to be a Direction to some worthy Gentlemen, who, not having sufficiently considered this Affair, extend it to all his Servants. A. B.

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trary Effect: but these produce Happiness by Prop. 8. *Ergo* a wise Man &c.
Q. E. D.

COROLL. I.

(d) It follows from the last Prop. that a wise Man ought to be sparing of his Words.

COROLL. II.

(e) It follows also that a wise Man ought to laugh but rarely.

SCHOLIUM.

The Truth of these two Corollaries is acknowledg'd by all the World, tho' the real Principles they are founded upon have not been discover'd before as to Talk-

(d) Here was a flaming Note upon the Abuse of Compliments, and some Remarks upon the Roughness of the *German* Tongue; with a Digression to prove that the *Italians* are the Descendants of the *Sybarites*, and not of the old *Romans*, as has generally been thought; which appears from the Smoothness of their Language, as well as several other Instances of Delicacy common to the two former People; and this accounts much better for the different Genius observable between the antient and modern Possessors of *Italy*, than the Change of Climate, which an eminent Writer alleges as the Cause.
A. B.

(e) The Author here takes Notice of the Wisdom of his Countrymen, who are famous for detesting every Thing which excites Laughter; to which Cause he attributes the Scarcity of Wit and Humour in their Writings: But as I was not perfectly satisfy'd of the Justness of his Remark, I forbore to put it in. A. B.

ing,

ing, PYTHAGORAS, the first Man that ever bore the Name of Philosopher, enjoyn'd his Disciples even a total Abstinence from it during the space of five Years ; in which Time he hop'd, I suppose, they might lose the Use of Speech ; and this Change, according to his Symbolical Method of instructing Mankind, he call'd *Metempsychosis*, εἰς ἅλλα ζῶα i. e. ἄφωνα, as all other Animals are known to be. As to Laughter, the Critics to a Man have condemn'd HOMER for making his Gods guilty of it ; for they all declare it to be inconsistent with the Nature of happy Beings, such as the Gods are suppos'd to be. But the gross Ignorance of the Age in which this great Poet liv'd ought to be his Excuse.

PROP. XII.

(f) A little Pain is to be preferr'd to a great one ; for a little one disturbs the pleasing Sensations less than a great one : but the pleasing Sensations produce Happiness by Prop. 8. *Ergo* a little Pain &c. Q. E. D.

(f) This Prop. and the last shew the great Caution of our Author in laying down Principles ; for as so considerable a Sect as that of the *Stoics* had denied Pain to be an Evil, he chose to prove Step by Step how it tends to destroy Happiness, and not set out like some rash Moralists with Axioms that are disputed. A. B.

C

A

P R O P. XIII.

A wise Man ought to get out of the Way when he sees a Beam ready to fall on his Head, contrary to the Opinion of that great Philosopher P Y R R H O : For tho' by Prop. 11. he ought to use the least Motion possible, yet since by Def. 2. he is sensible of Pain from the Impressions of certain Bodies upon him, and by Prop. 12. a little Pain is to be preferr'd to a great one, he may in this Case make use of Motion. *Ergo* a wise Man &c. Q. E. D.

C O R O L L.

(g) It follows from the last Prop. that a wise Man may now and then go to Church, in Countries where corporal Punishments are inflicted on those who

(g) Here the Author takes Occasion to fall upon the *Papists* for forcing the Consciences of Men ; but he seems to me to forget himself, and to deviate a little from his Principles. But till People can entirely overcome the Prejudices of Education, they will be apt to fall into Impropriety of Language ; frequent Examples of which may be observ'd among our fine Gentlemen, who call upon G—d to bless them, or the D—l to d—n them, without desiring the one or fearing the other. But perhaps our Author may use the Word Conscience in another Sense than what it generally means ; and in this Case he is only blameable for not having defin'd it : which Omission in relation to that very Word, a Body of Men whom he mentions afterwards with great Respect have been guilty of. A. B.

absent themselves entirely; provided at the same Time he does not contradict, Prop. 6.

PROP. XIV.

A wise Man may eat and drink, tho' it requires Motion: for those Actions are attended with the pleasing Sensations in a greater or less Degree, and so may be productive of Happiness by Prop. 8. This Prop. might also have been prov'd from Prop. 12. *Ergo* a wise Man &c. Q. E. D.

COROLL.

(b) The more Pleasure a Man takes in Eating and Drinking, the wiser he is.

SCHOLIUM.

The old *Romans* seem to have been sensible of this Truth, as appears by their applying the Word *Sapio* both to Wisdom and the exquisite Sensations which

(b) Here was a long Note upon *four Croute*, upon which Subject the Author seem'd to me to run into a Kind of Euthusiasm; but perhaps his Countrymen, who are the only proper Judges, may be of another Opinion, so that I dare not absolutely condemn him: however, as that Dish is not generally esteem'd in *England*, I have omitted the Encomiums he has made upon it as useless; promising nevertheless in some future Edition of this Work, if they shall be thought proper, to add them. Here the Author shews his Disapprobation of forcing Men to swallow down large Bumpers without giving them Leave to fetch their Breath; whereas by moderate Draughts, as he justly observes, a Man may have all the Comforts of Ebriety as effectually without that Inconvenience. A. B.

Meats and Drinks give a Man; and when the Moderns say a Person has a fine Taste, they mean equally a just and delicate Understanding or a nice Palate. *N. B.* The last Prop. wou'd have been unnecessary, if some eminent Philosophers, as may be seen in *DIOGENES LAERTIUS*, not having form'd right Notions of Happiness, rather than be at the Trouble of eating and drinking, chose to starve.

PROP. XV.

When a wise Man finds himself easy, he ought not on any Pretence of being better to change his State; for by Post. 1. one Happiness is not greater than another, and by Prop. 6. Happiness cannot arise from Views of Futurity. *Ergo* when a wise Man &c. *Q. E. D.*

COROLL.

(i.) Hence appears the Folly of the Opinion of those pretended Philosophers, who make Happiness consist in a continual Advancement towards an imaginary Perfection; an Opinion which has put Men upon turning the World upside down, and disturbing Mankind, in order to obtain Happiness.

PROP.

(i.) Here the Author shews a great deal of Learning while he exclaims against the restless Temper of Mankind, and gives many Instances of it; among which, he has not forgot the Zeal of certain Persons who

PROP. XVI.

Man was intended by Nature for lying, lolling, or sitting: for he was made for Happiness by Post. 2. but that is destroy'd by Motion, as appears by Prop. 11. therefore he was not made for walking, running, hopping, &c. nor for standing by Ax. 4. for all Animals which are form'd to stand have more Legs than two: besides, no Animal can change it's Posture in lying, lolling, or sitting, so much as Man. *Ergo* Man was intended &c.
Q. E. D.

COROLL. I.

It follows from this Prop. that a wise Man ought always to have a Bed in his Room.

COROLL. II.

It follows also that he ought not constantly to lye, loll, or sit in the same Posture.

who make a considerable Part of the History of two or three Centuries, being remarkable for having expos'd themselves to Poverty, Contempt and Death, under Pretence of serving Mankind, by perswading them to become like Themselves, regardless of their own Good, and anxious for that of all others. He also mentions with great Contempt SOLON, LYCURGUS, SOCRATES, BRUTUS, and the two CATOS; and deplores very pathetically the Mischief they have done by their Examples. A. B.

SCHO.

SCHOLIUM.

Hence appears the Reason why all other Animals get upon their Legs at their first coming into the World; whereas walking with Man is an Art, in which he cannot arrive at Perfection but with much Difficulty, and after some Years Experience.

PROP. XVII.

A wise Man ought to consult his own Ease in all his Actions, without considering how they may affect others; for Man may arrive at Happiness by Prop. 2. and therefore he ought to aim at it: but he cannot obtain it by Benevolence, *i. e.* a Disposition to neglect his own Good for the Sake of others, by Prop. 4. *Ergo* a wise Man *Sc. Q. E. D.* Again, an uncertain Evil is rather to be ventur'd, than a certain one committed, by Ax. 6. but Pain, being contrary to the pleasing Sensations, is an Evil, and certain to him who does not consult his own Ease; but what gives Pain to others he is not oblig'd to know by Prop. 2. and therefore it must be uncertain. *Ergo* a wise Man *Sc. Q. E. D. (k.)* G E-

(k.) This Prop. discovers to us the true Foundation of Beauty in easy Behaviour; which distinguishes so advantageously the modern well-bred Man from the old-fashion'd Courtier: the Former in the greatest Company, if he be seated in an Elbow-Chair, shall
cast

GENERAL COROLLARY.

As it appears from the foregoing Propositions, that Happiness consists in Ease, since every Enjoyment takes its Value from conducing towards, and consequently is subordinate, to that End ; it follows, that a wise Man will neglect even the bodily Pleasures where they are not to be had without much Difficulty, and consequently in the like Case will condemn all those Things which are Means only to procure the bodily Pleasures *a fortiori*. This beautifully reconciles Luxury with Poverty ; which has hitherto been thought a Secret only known to certain Fraternities of religious Institution.

I chose to prove the last Prop. two Ways, because I look on it as of the utmost Importance ; it throws Light over most of the obscure Cases which may tend to puzzle Men in their Conduct in relation to others ; it alone makes all other Books of Morality useless ; it frees a Man from the Restraints of (l) Civility, the Pangs of

cast a Leg over one of the Arms ; at another Time shall adjust his Toupee at the Glass, whistle a Tune, or slide into the Minuet Step, just as it suits his present Humour ; while the latter thinks himself oblig'd to have a constant Attention to the Taste of those about him. But as nothing can be really beautiful that is not natural, our Philosophic Age has exploded a Notion so contrary to true Politeness. *A. B.*

(l) This shews the Author was ignorant of real Good-breeding as explain'd in Note k. *A. B.*

Sym-

Sympathy, and the Remorses of a misguided Conscience, and gives him in all Situations (not virtually included in Prop. 13.) the most unbounded Liberty.

All the Propositions in general are of a very extensive Nature, and will upon a superficial View only produce many others equally beautiful: They will lead Men thro' Life with much Comfort; and when attended to with that careless sort of Diligence which is the distinguishing Mark of a true (*m*) Adept, will save him many Troubles which others undergo.

I will not however pretend to say that they will explain all the nice Cases which may possibly be propos'd on the Subject of Happiness; for Instance, whether a wise Man ought to sit still and let his Fire go out in cold Weather, or get up and fetch a Piece of Wood? whether he ought to run when he's catch'd in a Shower, or suffer himself to be wet to the Skin? whether he shall be at the Pains of calling a.

(*m*.) I can't upon this Occasion forbear to mention, that I have with great Pleasure observ'd several rising Genius's in this Nation practise many of our Authors Rules merely by the Force of Nature with incredible Success. I am unwilling however to name them, lest I shou'd offend that Modesty, which, I am persuaded, is the only Cause they have not made all the Progress they are otherwise fitted for, towards Happiness, and which this Theory is intended to remove. *A. B.*

loud

loud to his Servant, or omit drinking a Glafs of Wine? whether he fhall go without his Breakfast, or make Tea Himfelf? with fome curious Questions which may be put concerning a certain delicate Affair, as will appear from comparing together Prop. 8. and 11. and which I forbear to mention, having not yet entirely got over that (n) foolifh Modesty inftill'd into me in my Infancy. The Difquifition of the Questions above mention'd depends upon fo many Circumftances; as the Eligibility of the different Kinds of Pleafures and Pains, the Degrees of each, and the particular Tastes of Men; that I hope, when 'tis confider'd that no one has hitherto attempted to folve them by any System yet publish'd, it will not be objected to me as a Deficiency of any great Confequence.

As there is a Set of Men in the World for whom I have the moft profound Veneration, as being acknowledg'd to have a

(n) If this Writer had been converfant among the *Jefuits*, he wou'd have learnt to have laid afide this foolifh Modesty, as he rightly calls it; for in Cafes which concern a Man's Duty, graveft Perfons may, as they juftly obferve, fpeak plain; and this Liberty has been practis'd to the great Edification of the World by Father SANCHEZ, as well as feveral other excellent Cafuifts of the fame Order, and approv'd of by the greateft Part of thofe moft pious and confcientious Doctors. A. B.

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true

true Relish of Happiness, as well as a perfect Skill in the Ways of acquiring it ; I shou'd be sorry, unless where 'tis absolutely necessary, to differ in the least Point from them ; I mean, the Illustrious Body of *Freethinkers*. Now at first Sight Prop. 3. may seem to contradict their most essential Maxim ; and therefore tho' only such as are Strangers to their Writings and Conversation can run into that Mistake, I will take the Pains to clear my System from an Imputation which might do it much Discredit among the Judicious: And this I shall easily do, by only considering the Meaning of the Word (*o*) *Free* when compounded, as in this Case, with another Word. For Example ; what does a Free-Agent mean, but a Being who may act or not act just as he sees fit ; for as soon as he is oblig'd to act or not to act, he no longer deserves that Title. The *Freethinkers*

(*o*) I was apt to suspect this whole Passage was an Interpolation by some *English* Hand, because the Word *Frey-gedanker* is not pure *German*, till I consider'd that the Author in all Probability having been conversant in our Writings, as most of the Learned abroad are known to be, chose to translate literally a Term so expressive, in speaking of a Sect which has made the greatest Figure under that Appellation ; and in this Thought I was confirm'd, when I found great Reason to believe he had been in *England*, as will appear by a Note towards the End. *A. B.*

therefore,

therefore, by their very Name, imply that they are not oblig'd to think; and therefore that Thinking is not necessary. Now that which is not necessary to be done, may as well at least be let alone; and if I have carried their grand Dogma a little farther, and said that 'tis better to be let alone, 'twas upon such strong Proof, that I am sure they themselves will readily allow the Justness of my Reasoning.

But there is another Proposition, which not only seems, but is certainly contrary to their Maxims and Practice, *viz.* Prop. 15. And in order to vindicate myself, I can only say, that the greatest Men are liable to Error, and I believe they are in one here; an Error however very excusable, since it may have proceeded from that laudable Antipathy which they have express'd upon all Occasions to a certain Sect famous for their Zeal in the Cause of *Religion* and *Virtue*; two Words, invented to destroy all true Notions of Happiness, as explain'd above. I own the Agreement of that Prop. with the Doctrines of those deluded Persons call'd (*p.*) *Chr—*, tho' founded upon Reasons, and attended with Circumstan-

(*p.*) I cannot make out whom the Author hints at here, and therefore leave the same Letters with the Dash which I found in the Manuscript; perhaps some more acute Genius may discover his Meaning. *A. B.*

ces essentially different, gave me some Scruples; but the evident Connection it has with my Principles, forc'd me to admit it. And I hope this slight Deviation from the afore-mention'd illustrious Body will be pardon'd me, since I have made amends for it by a perfect Conformity with them throughout almost all the other Parts of my System. I call it mine, because I have put it in a new Method; tho' I own that Part of it is as old as the *Cyrenaiics*; Part of it is extracted from the *Epicureans*, and their Successors the well-dress'd Philosophers of these Days; and the Remainder, unless what is entirely my own, owes much Lustre to the (q) *Quietists*. But as Truths of such Consequence are not quickly discover'd, or at least not plac'd in their best Light; I have been at infinite Pains in ascertaining doubtful Passages of Authors, clearing up the Obscurities of learned Critics, humanising the sublime Ideas of Metaphysicians, and tracing Nature thro' the Modesty of a prejudic'd Education; and have at length successfully put

(q) The Author must certainly have mistaken the Meaning of the *Quietists*; for nothing can be more opposite than their Sentiments to his whole Doctrine, tho' their Expressions are indeed sometimes so exalted, that I do not wonder he has fall'n into that Mistake: I imagine he particularly alludes to their famous Dogma, of the Duty

put the whole in so plain a way, that no Man, who does not purposely endeavour to do it, can miss of Happiness. I have luckily fallen into a Method entirely consistent with the commendable Tranquility of those who have a true Taste for this noble Science, if I may, without Impropriety make use of a Word upon this Occasion which generally carries with it the Idea of every thing which ought to be unlearned; I have luckily, I say, hit the Taste of every genuine Philosopher, by the fewness of the Propositions, the brevity of them, and such a (r) Simplicity of reasoning, as interferes the least that is possible with Prop. 3. Were it not for the infinite Advantage I myself may reap by this Piece, I shou'd regret the many anxious Hours I have spent about it, which might have been better employ'd in an Elbow Chair; but I shall be more able for the future, by a meritorious and lear-

Duty of suspending all the Faculties of the Soul; which bears some Resemblance to Prop. 3. and their strong Expressions of the Meanness of loving imperfect Creatures; which may seem likewise to coincide with Prop. 4. A. B.

(r) The Word *Simplicity* has a doubtful Meaning, but I cou'd find no other that comes so near the Original as this, and I cannot suspect the judicious Reader shou'd fall into an Error about it; and as for others, I desire no better than to give them an Opportunity of being more merry than wise, according to Coroll. 2. Prop. 11. A. B.

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ned Indolence, to make amends for the unnecessary Labours of my past Life: for such is the Unhappiness of Man, that he is forc'd to think, to find out that he ought not to think.

And now, O my worthy Partners in Tranquility, since it costs me no new Pains, ye also are welcome to enjoy the Fruits of my Labours. Learn from hence to loll with a becoming assuredness in your easy Chairs, on your soft Couches, and your downy Beds; learn in Winter to wrap your selves well up in furr'd Gowns, and in Summer to stretch your Limbs on Violets and Roses beneath some shady Tree; and when you move, for Man alas! must sometimes move, that it may be with the least Inconvenience possible, remember to have (s) Springs to your Coaches, and long Poles to your Chairs; nor be disturb'd at the Reflexions of restless Mortals, who overlook

(s) From hence it appears, that our Author has not only been at *London*, but also at *Paris*; for his descending in this Part of his Advice into a particular Refinement of Life so little understood elsewhere, shews that his Imagination must have been struck upon riding in the Chairs of the *English* and the Coaches of the *French*; both which are remarkable for an Easiness, which is entirely owing to the Contrivances mention'd by him. Every Man who has been jolted in the Coaches of the former, and jirk'd in the Chairs of the latter, will be sensible of the Importance of this Advice. A. B.

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the sweet Repose of Life. and absurdly imagine that Happiness; *i. e.* Ease, is to be found among the busy Scenes of Scholars, Heroes, and Patriots.

GENERAL SCHOLIUM.

If any Man thinks this System of Happiness incompleat, I desire him to shew how any other consistent one can be drawn up without running into Notions perfectly conciding with, if not borrow'd from, a Religion which the profound Wisdom of this Age thinks fit to explode, and therefore such Notions as must deserve the same Treatment.

F I N I S.

Erratum. P. 16. last Line of the SCHOLIUM, after the Word before, put a full Point; and begin a new Period at the next Word, As, &c.

